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MILITARY TERROR AND SILENCE IN 
BEU\ZIL,1910-1945 
SHAWN C. SMALLMAN 
Portland State University 
Abstract. Throughout the twentieth century, the Brazilian military has gone to great 
lengths to conceal its use of terror. The armed forces have kidnapped journalists, cen­
sored newspapers, and threatened authors. Such censorship and silencing have not only 
limited criticism from powerful social groups, but have also enabled the military to 
defend political myths that are in its interest. To date, however, few scholars have 
carefully examined military terror in Brazil, although testimonials abound. In order to 
better understand this phenomenon, consequently, this study examines two specific cases 
ofmilitary terror in Brazil, and the armed forces' efforts to silence or shape the memory 
of these events. 
Resume. Au cours du XXe siecle, I'armee bresilienne s'est efforcer de voiler sa 
politique de terreur par I' enlevement de journalistes, la censure de la presse et I' intimi­
dation des ecrivains. Cette politique de baillonnement n'a pas seulement portee atteinte 
it la liberte de critique des groupes sociaux puissants, elle a aussi permis it I' armee de 
poser en defenseur de mythes politiques qui servent ses interets. Jusqu'ici, bien que les 
temoignages de cette terreur abondent, peu de specialistes se sont penches sur Ie 
probleme. Pour I' eclairer, I' analyse portera sur deux cas specifiques illustrant I' emploi 
de terreur militaire et les efforts entrepris par I' armee pour faire taire ou pour forger Ie 
souvenir de ces evenements. 
"I don't know ... the heat ... the weather was hot." 
- Frigate Captain Francisco Jose Marques da Rocha explaining to a 
reporter why 16 prisoners in his care had died on Christmas Eve 1910. 
CorreiodaManhCi, 17 January 1911, p. 1. 
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"Ifwe were the only ones who knew this monstrous fact, we would certainly 
not divulge it, judging the terror and revulsion it would cause." 
- The pro-government paper aPaiz lamentingthat the public had learned 
about the massacre ofsailors. aPaiz, 19 January 1911, p. 1. 
Introduction 
Military terror is the use of intense fear and violence by armed forces to 
achieve institutional or political goals. 1 Terror, it should be pointed out, 
differs from repression, which can and does often take place within a 
legal framework. Moreover, the instruments of terror (murder, kidnap­
ping, disappearance and torture) tend to be illegal according to the state's 
own laws. 
In the case of Brazil many authors, such as Alfred Stepan, Daniel 
Zirker and Lawrence Weschler, have thoughtfully considered the mili­
tary's use of torture after the 1964 coup.2 However, research on the ori­
gins ofmilitary terror during the period between 1910 and 1945 has been 
hampered by the military. This was a time when the armed forces in­
creasingly used terror to uphold the nation's racial hierarchy, to main­
tain military discipline and to defend the state.3 To conceal this violence, 
the Brazilian armed forces kidnapped journalists, stripped scholars of 
their political rights, censored newspapers and banned books.4 At one 
point, the navy interned one victim of its violence in a mental hospital in 
order to prevent the public from learning about military repression. 5 Even 
so, too much evidence of military terror existed for such efforts to suc­
ceed fully, and evidence ofmilitary torture in the end became well known. 
Yet, the military's efforts to conceal terror did help it to preserve and 
promote political myths. 
Censorship and silencing have always accompanied military terror 
in Brazil, for obvious reasons. Censorship made it difficult to hold spe­
cific individuals or groups accountable. It limited criticism from power­
ful social groups and international actors. The Brazilian military main­
tained a sense oflegitimacy, which public knowledge ofits violence could 
have undermined. Indeed, the military justified its intervention in civil­
ian affairs by claiming that its moral superiority over civilian leaders 
made it a tool of national salvation.6 At the same time, silencing accom­
plished more subtle goals. In an atmosphere in which unauthored stories 
and rumours abounded, the political impact ofterror was magnified. The 
military demonstrated its power by erasing or shaping the public memory 
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ofkey events. Censorship also enabled the military to defme its victims in 
terms of particular identities, which justified their repression. Terror and 
silencing helped the military, in co-operation with civilian elites, to de­
fend political beliefs that legitimated its involvement in civilian affairs. 
Two cases ofmilitary terror in Brazil are examined here in an effort 
to establish this thesis. As will be shown, in each case the armed forces 
went to great lengths to silence or shape the memory of its violence. 
The Revolt of the Whip, 1910 
There are continuities in military terror that extend as far back as the 
colonial period. Nonetheless, the Revolt of the Whip provides a useful 
starting place for this investigation, as the first moment in twentieth cen­
tury Brazil when the armed forces used a major program of terror to 
crush internal dissent. 7 When the Brazilian Republic was established in 
1889, military violence and torture tended to be directed towards mem­
bers of the armed forces itself, especially to Afro-Brazilians in the lower 
ranks. By means of terror, army leaders upheld not only their authority 
but also the racial hierarchy within the country. Although Brazilians have 
taken pride since the 1940s in what Gilberto Freyre has called their na­
tion's "racial democracy," race has historically influenced all aspects of 
Brazilian society.8 Although discrimination was not institutionalized and 
legal as it was in the United States, over the years it has certainly defined 
Brazil's class system. 
Like Brazilian society, the armed forces had long been divided along 
racial lines. 9 The officer corps was largely white, while the enlisted men 
were either black or mixed-race. Indeed, as late as the 1940s army regu­
lations prevented people of colour and Jews from entering the military 
schools that trained officers. 10 This racial division has especially shaped 
the navy, long perceived as an elite bastion. Most sailors were ex-slaves 
or the sons of slaves who entered the navy against their will. They could 
not leave the service until they completed 15 years in the ranks, where 
they endured racial abuse and physical violence. II Commanders flogged 
sailors for minor infractions, using leather whips tipped with metal balls. 12 
As officers tried to control their men by terror on isolated ships, racial 
tensions became extreme. 
The Revolt of the Whip began in 1910 when black sailors, unhappy 
with their treatment, carefully planned an uprising within the navy. 13 They 
chose as their leader First Class Helmsman J oao Candido F elisberto, an 
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experienced sailor on the dreadnought Minas Gerais, who became known 
as the "Black Admiral." A sailor (Marcelino Rodrigues Meneses) was 
whipped into unconsciousness with more than 200 blows in front of his 
fellow sailors. The whipping continued after he fainted. A wave of anger 
caused conspirators to advance their plans. On 22 November 1910, sailors 
seized a number ofnavy ships, killed white officers who resisted, impris­
oned the rest and trained their guns on Rio de Janeiro. The city's populace 
panicked. In the initial confusion, rebels on the Minas Ge rais fired rounds 
into the Castello favela (shantytown), killing two small children. 14 Yet 
overall the rebels showed remarkable discipline, unity and restraint. After 
the sailors' initial struggle to seize the ships, no equipment was damaged, 
and no officers were killed. The rebels' immediate demand was for an end 
to corporal punishment and a general amnesty. 15 
The government quickly moved army troops to the presidential pal­
ace and the coastline, but they could do little to overpower the fleet. Both 
the president, Marshal Hermes Rodriguez daFonseca (a military officer), 
and Congress had to accede to the rebels' demands to save the capital 
from bombardment. The government issued official statements of regret 
and amnestied all sailors involved. This decision provoked outrage and 
protest by both the army and the navy. 16 But the announcement satisfied 
the sailors, who returned control of the ships to their commanders on 
Saturday, 26 November 1910. 
The government's amnesty did not end the crisis. On 28 November 
1910, President Hermes passed a decree that allowed the Minister of the 
Navy to expel without trial any sailors who undermined discipline. I7 
Sailors viewed this law as an effort to reverse the amnesty. The attitude 
of naval commanders also angered sailors. White officers believed that 
their men were racially inferior and could be controlled only by force. 
Their attitudes were captured in a book published the following year by 
an anonymous white officer. The book, Politica versus marinha, described 
Afro-Brazilians as a primitive race, incapable ofadvancement. Its author 
argued that Brazilian sailors needed to be controlled by the whip, as had 
slaves. 18 Naval commanders deliberately provoked a second uprising by 
brutal treatment that included whippings. 19 
On 9 December 1910, the naval battalion on Ilha das Cobras (Snake 
Island) rose up. Joao Candido and sailors on the dreadnoughts Minas 
Gerais, Sao Paulo and Bahia remained loyal to the government. Only 
the destroyer Rio Grande do Sui joined the rebellion. This fact allowed 
the armed forces to suffocate the uprising. The naval hierarchy then used 
9 Smallman / Military Terror and Silence in Brazil, 1910-1945 
~. the rebellion as a pretext to expel amnestied sailors from the institution. 
:,'; Hours after Congress declared a state of siege, the navy began to remove 
?, sailors from the fleet. 20 The events that followed illustrate the conditions 
, 
. under which the military used terror, and the lengths to which the armed 
~! forces would go to conceal this violence. 
The navy arrested sailors who had remained loyal to the govern­
ment throughout the second uprising, including Joao Candido. It impris­
oned many of these men on the naval base on Ilha das Cobras. On 24 
December 1910, 18 prisoners were placed in an underground cell on the 
orders ofthe island's commander, Frigate Captain Francisco Jose Marques 
da Rocha. The men had been beaten and were suffering from both hun­
ger and thirst. 21 Later that evening naval officers poured buckets ofquick­
lime (a powerful corrosive, which forms whitewash when mixed with 
water) into their cell to "disinfect" it, perhaps a symbolic reply to a racial 
challenge.22 When the jailer opened the cell on Christmas morning 16 
men were dead. Only Joao Candido and naval soldier Joao Avelino Lira 
had survived.23 
A crucial aspect ofmilitary terror is the institution's effort to silence 
all discussion of its use of violence. The navy hierarchy did its best to 
hide these events from the public. The base commander, Frigate Captain 
Francisco Jose Marques da Rocha, forced doctor Ferreira de Abreu to list 
the cause ofthe men's death as inso/a9iio (sunstroke) on the death certifi­
cate. The men were all buried at night. 
The graphic details of the case, however, soon became public in 
January 1911, as letters from witnesses poured into the newspaper Correio 
da Manhii.24 Of course, many elites were discomfited by the publicity. 
Even some papers, such as the pro-govenunent newspaper 0 Paiz, wished 
to silence discussion of the massacre: "If we were the only ones who 
knew this monstrous fact, we would certainly not divulge it, judging the 
terror and revulsion it would cause.,,25 Still, the press as a whole criti­
cized Marques da Rocha, who in turn accused his enemies of spreading 
falsehoods about him. When asked why so many men had died he said, 
"I don't know ... the heat ... the weather was hot.,,26 But the horror of 
Christmas Eve 1910 was not caused by isolated officers but rather formed 
part of naval policy, as shown by the future careers of the officers in­
volved. For example, Marques da Rocha was charged in the men's death, 
but he was absolved in June 1911. Brazilian President Hermes subse­
quently invited him to a private dinner, and a few days later he was pro­
moted. 27 
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The military violence at Ilha das Cobras can best be understood as 
part of a larger pattern of terror. Over a thousand sailors were expelled 
from the navy, and an unknown number were sent into interior exile in 
the Amazon. Brazil had long used its remote and unhealthy interior (which 
Helio Leonicio Martins called an "Equatorial Siberia") to punish rebel sol­
diers and political dissidents.28 After a rebellion in 1904, the government 
rounded up hundreds ofits opponents and sent them to the Amazon. Con­
tinuing this pattern, on 24 December 1910 the ship Sateiite set sail for the 
Brazilian state ofAcre with 97 former sailors aboard.29 Without any legal 
proceeding, one half of these men were condemned to string telegraph 
lines for Brazil's famous General Rondon and the other half to work for 
the Companhla da Estrada de Ferro Madeira-Marmore (Madeira-Marmore 
Railway Company). 30 
Congressman Rui Barbosa, commenting on the location to which the 
sailors were sent, offered that "Santo Antonio do Madeira is a place where 
one only dies; one does not live, one is not born: one dies. This is the 
reputation that Santo Antonio do Madeira enjoys.,,3} The rumours surround­
ing this location, in fact, marked it as a place of fear, like all the places 
Brazil sent its exiles. Although the figures are for a later period and loca­
tion, in the 1920s over halfofthe prisoners sent into internal exile died. In 
the case of the Satelite, officers also chose seven prisoners for brutal 
treatment. Red crosses marked their names on the list of prisoners when 
the ship sailed on Christmas Day 1910.32 The ship's commander (Second 
Lieutenant Francisco de Melo) later claimed that he feared a possible re­
bellion, based on an informant's warning. Although 79 armed soldiers were 
on board (and the unarmed prisoners were locked below decks) he ordered 
seven men to be first whipped, then shot in "self-defence.,,33 
The navy tried to conceal these events, but by early May 1911 the 
press had learned of this case. President Hermes publicly supported Sec­
ond Lieutenant Francisco de Melo's decision to shoot the men. Incred­
ibly, Hermes argued that the soldiers were too seasick to control the sail­
ors, which left no other option but "measures of supreme energy. ,,34 The 
massacre's leader, Francisco de Melo, was never punished. Indeed, the 
Minister of War commended him in a military bulletin for his service on 
the Satelite. He was also promoted.35 
Despite a brief period of public outrage, discussion of this violence 
faded not only from the press but also from public memory, in part be­
cause the navy went to extraordinary lengths to keep this history con­
cealed. On 11 April 1911, a team ofnaval doctors examined J oao Candido 
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and declared that he was mentally ilL Expelled from the navy, he was in­
terned for a year and a half in a mental hospital, even though he was so lucid 
that his nurses let him go home every night, provided he returned in the 
morning. By this means the navy ensured that a government inquiry would 
not hear his account of events.36 For more than 50 years the navy and the 
government used terror against journalists and scholars to suppress all 
memory ofthe revolt, with amazing success. In 1934, the journalist Aparicio 
Torelly announced plans to publish 10 articles on the rebellion in the paper 
Fo/ha do Povo. He published two articles before naval officers kidnapped 
and beat him. The paper halted the series.37 The secret police censored all 
mention ofthe rebellion during Getulio Vargas' authoritarian Estado Novo 
(New State, 1937-1945). Authors such as Adao Manuel Pereira Nunes 
were forced to use pseudonyms to write on the topic. 38 Incredibly, even 
after Brazil's 1964 militruy coup, two civilian authors and authorities on 
the revolt, Edmar Morel and Adao Pereira Nunes, both had their political 
rights suspended. 
Overall, Brazilians have preferred to blame the uprising on foreign 
influences rather than internal factors such as racism. Gilberto Freyre, 
for example, has discussed the naval rebellion in his Order and Progress. 
In this work he quoted the racist comments of the naval officer who 
authored Politica versus marinha. Yet he did not stress the importance of 
mce as a cause of the rebellion,or criticize the officer's statements; in­
stead, Gilberto Freyre emphasized that the sailors "developed their revo­
lutionruy sentiments under European influences." Freyre ignored the re­
pression that followed the uprising. His work ended with the government 
granting the sailors amnesty. As the man who coined the term "racial 
. democracy," and someone who sympathized with the militruy during the 
early years of authoritarian rule, Freyre failed to challenge the militruy's 
historical hegemony.39 Other authors such as Edmar Morel and Adao 
Manuel Pereira Nunes did undermine the official story but, as we have 
seen, at a heavy personal price. More recent works on this subject have 
tended to toe the militruy line. In his 1988 work, Helio Leonicio Martins 
(a naval officer) argues that the death of sailors whom officers suffocated 
with quicklime represented an unfortunate accident. Moreover, his work 
ignores the racial aspect of terror.40 
Yet, in their totality, it is clear that the armed forces' efforts at silenc­
ing can be understood only when placed in the context ofrace in Brazilian 
society and politics. Brazilian elites have taken pride in their nation's "ra­
cial democracy." Nonetheless, race has long shaped all aspects ofBrazil­
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ian society.41 While there has been no fonnal system of segregation in 
Brazil, race has served as a marker for political power in this culture. In 
this context, the Revolt of the Whip acquired racial overtones, unlike a 
mere military rebellion.42 Certainly, Brazilian elites viewed the rebellion 
as a challenge to Brazil's racial order. A political cartoon on the cover of 
the Brazilian magazine Careta on 10 December 1910 shows two thin white 
officers saluting an obese black sailor. The caption reads "The Discipline 
ofthe Future," implying what would happen ifwhite officers ceased to use 
the whip. The cartoon reflected the views ofnaval officers, who believed 
in the racial inferiority of their men. But the cartoon also captured elites' 
fears that without violence they would lose their privileged social posi­
tion.43 It was no coincidence that while Joao Candido became known as 
"the Black Admiral," President Hermes da Fonseca acquired the nickname 
"President Very White.,,44 
In this racial context, the armed forces used mass violence during a 
moment of crisis not only to re-establish lines of authority within the 
navy but also to uphold racial nonns.45 At the same time, acknowledging 
this violence and the reasons for its use would have undennined key 
legitimating myths in Brazilian society. In this context, it was not only 
that the Brazilian navy wished to protect itself by hiding its crimes, or 
that the government wished to conceal evidence of scandal. The question 
of military terror was explosive because it was tied to the question of 
race. Of course, many Brazilian elites were horrified when they learned 
what the navy had done, and segments of the Brazilian public were scan­
dalized. Because the use of military terror undennined Brazil's political 
mythology, it had to be accompanied by censorship. 
Communism and Terror: 1935 
It was the unusual character of the Revolt of the Whip (challenging Bra­
zil's racial hierarchy) that led to the employment of such extreme mili­
tary violence. Because subsequent military rebellions did not radically 
challenge Brazil's social structure, they did not meet with such an ex­
treme reaction. For example, when junior army officers rebelled against 
the government during the 1920s, the military's use of terror was less 
extensive.46 The rebels (called tenentes because most of them held the 
rank of lieutenant) lacked a clear program and mainly called for a series 
oftechnocratic refonns. They also failed to rally support among the masses 
that might have challenged the elite politics of the Old Republic.47 The 
government did send rebel soldiers into internal exile, but only the en­
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listed men, not the officers.48 The government certainly did not target the 
tenentes' leaders for murder, as it had the leadership ofthe 1910 rebellion. 
In 1935, however, military army and navy officers created a massive 
program of state terror in response to what they perceived as a terrifying 
effort at social revolution. In 1930 Gemlio Vargas overthrew the Old 
Republic, after he claimed to have been cheated out of an electoral vic­
tory. Vargas's ascension to power marked the onset of mass politics in 
Brazil. His inauguration also created a new (and ostensibly democratic) 
political system, which was no longer under the strict control of tradi­
tional elites. This system entailed new challenges for the armed forces, 
which were captured by social turmoil as contending political forces sought 
to dominate Brazilian society. Officers were frightened by the efforts of 
populist politicians to appease their men, at a time when non-commis­
sioned officers frequently rebelled.49 Officers had good reason to fear 
the growing influence held by mass political parties and charismatic ci­
vilian leaders. When a conspiracy began within the armed forces to over­
throw the government, the Communist party seized upon the plot as a 
means to create a social revolution. 50 
In 1934, army and navy officers began to plot against the government. 51 
Their plan to overthrow the federal government was driven as much by 
humiliation as by ideology. Some officers had left the armed forces after 
1930; others had lost the prestige they had enjoyed before the Revolution. 
These officers allied with civilian politicians who desired a revolution, 
under the nominal leadership of former President Artur Bernardes. The 
nation was divided into zones, each ofwhich had a military commander. 
Army and naval officers infiltrated police forces and collected military 
weapons. The conspirators successfully targeted the sergeants and the lower 
ranks to create their combat force. They created ties with almost every 
garrison in the country and worked with state police forces. 
Their conspiracy, however, was quickly infiltrated by the chief ofpo­
lice in the federal district, led by an army officer named Filinto Muller. By 
the end of the year Muller had a clear picture of the conspirators' entire 
plan. Perhaps even worse for the conspirators, between October 1934 and 
January 1935 the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) began to take part in 
the plot. As General Pedro Aurelio de Goes Monteiro described, military 
conspirators had divided among three currents. One faction (linked to Sao 
Paulo) involved both officers and civilians; a second was purely military, 
composed ofgenerals and admirals who shared authoritarian ideals; and a 
third was made up of officers and enlisted men to whom Communism 
seemed an attractive ideology. The latter faction attracted the attention of 
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the Soviet Union. In particular, Communist agents noted the profound divi­
sion between officers, who were loyal to fonner president Artur da Silva 
Bernardes, and the sergeants, who wished to make a social revolution. 52 
These ideological divisions affected the conspiracy and made the move­
ment susceptible to an external takeover. 
As Moscow followed the conspiracy, it became convinced that this 
uprising could succeed. The Communist International (Comintern) sent 
its best leaders to Brazil from Gennany, the Soviet Union and the United 
States. In addition, the Comintern was able to build upon the earlier work 
of rebel officers (tenentes) during the 1920s. Luis Carlos Prestes, the 
fonner head of the tenentemovement, had converted to Communism 
while in exile in Bolivia. He left Moscow that winter and arrived in Bra­
zil in April 1935 to take over the conspiracy. Olga Benario accompanied 
him. A member of the Soviet military's secret service, she took responsi­
bility for his safety. 53 
The rebel organization was vulnerable to a takeover. The Commu­
nists' success came very quickly. The first organized leftist elements be­
gan to penetrate the conspiracy only in January 1935. By March 1935 the 
Communists dominated the movement. This horrified many command­
ers, who had been uncertain whether to take advantage of the strength of 
the Communist party for their own ends. The date for the revolution may 
have been set originally for Carnival week in February 1935, but by that 
point senior commanders feared the Communists' power within their own 
movement. 54 After July 1935 most officers who remained in the con­
spiracy either chose to leave or were forced out by Prestes. A revolution­
ary political party had seized the conspiracy the officers had created. 
In July 1935 Vargas outlawed the National Liberation Alliance, the 
front organization for the conspirators. In the face ofgovernment repres­
sion, Prestes found that he was unable to rally widespread support for his 
uprising from civilians. This suited Prestes because he had considerable 
experience plotting a military rebellion. His agents continued to fan out 
throughout the army, where they won over soldiers to their cause. By 
November 1935, the Communists' plans were fully laid. From the north­
ern city ofNatal to the nation's capital ofRio de Janeiro, soldiers rose up 
to seize control of the army from their commanders. 
In the end, however, the rebellion ended in disaster because of the 
poor co-ordination of the Communists, the apathy of workers, the effi­
ciency ofthe police and the warnings of the British. In the aftennath of the 
uprising, generals and admirals were in no mood for mercy. The Minister 
of the Navy, Henrique Aristides Guilhem, and the Minister ofWar, Joao 
~ 
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Gomes Ribeiro Filho, were terrified by the revolt and recognized their 
colleagues' desire to purge the armed forces and society. As naval officer 
Ernani do Amaral Peixoto noted, the memory of the 1910 rebellion re­
mained fresh within the navy, where it created a special horror of rebel­
lion.55 With naval officers' worst fears realized, commanders were willing 
to repress dissent with terror. Admiral Guilhem expressed his institution's 
outlook: "Cleansing and punishment are needed ...." 
Similar sentiments existed within the army. During the fighting, Min­
ister ofWar J oao Gomes Ribeiro Filho told General Eurico Gaspar Dutra, 
"Let's bomb everything, because I don't want any of that rabble to come 
out ofthere alive." After the rebels laid down their arms, Gomes wanted 
to have them summarily shot. President Vargas had to give him a direct 
order that this was not to take place.56 
Given this climate within the armed forces, it is not surprising that 
Minister of War Gomes denounced the "liberalism" of legislation that 
restricted the "kind of repression required. ,,57 In fact, Brazilian laws did 
little to curb the military's use of terror, because neither the president nor 
Congress had the will to see them enforced. The army and navy as insti­
tutions played a crucial role in this repression, which went far beyond 
arresting officers, transporting them to their torture, legitimating their 
suffering and influencing the officers commanding civilian police. Be­
cause the uprising had taken the fonn of an attack on the armed forces, 
officers believed that they had to take an active role in the movement's 
repression. Many ofthe torturers were army and naval officers, as in the 
cases of Victor Allen Barron and Elise Saborowski, two members of 
Comintern. Soldiers were also victimized by violence. Muller arrested 
1,300 soldiers, who were taken to an isolated island for "safe-keeping.,,58 
These men did not find safety in their seclusion. 
It is difficult to overstate the savagery of the state terror that ensued. 
The special police and military officers tortured not only their prisoners 
but also their victims' wives and children. 59 Prisoners had sharp objects 
forced under their fingernails until their hands were maimed, as hap­
pened with Jose Romero, the head of the Brazilian Communist party, 
who was beaten and tortured for a week. Some prisoners simply disap­
peared.60 
No one was exempt. The armed forces insisted that the government 
arrest specific individuals, and even Vargas feared to resist their demands. 
Many people unconnected to the conspiracy suffered. The state and the 
military seized upon this opportunity to repress not only Communists but 
also anarchists, union leaders, "socialists, progressives, and refonners of 
f 
i~ 
L 
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all stripes .... ,,61 But the military reserved its worst ferocity for actual con­
spirators. 
The German Arthur Ernst Ewert (alias Harry Berger) was tortured 
with electric shocks. Brazilian officer Nelson Werneck Sodre alleges that 
Ewert also watched soldiers repeatedly rape his wife, Elise Saborowski 
(Elise Ewert), until he lost his reason.62 Minna Ewert wrote a heartbreak­
ing description of her brother and sister-in-Iaw's torture: 
In my brother's presence they beat my sister-in-law's naked body till she 
fainted. They burned my brother with lighted cigarettes till he had two 
hundred burns. He was hit on the head till he lost consciousness and 
then was given an injection in the arm which revived him and the tortur­
ers began again. Another torture consisted in [ sic] choking him, six times 
in the course ofthe night. Furthermore, both ofthem were tortured with 
electric shocks, and one of his wife's ears was badly burnt.63 
Minna Ewert's efforts to save her family proved futile. Vargas ultimately 
sent Saborowski to Germany, where she met her death in a concentration 
camp.64 
Victor Allan Barron, an American who had formerly been a member 
of the Communist Youth, underwent horrible tortures after his arrest. 
Although most of these tortures took place at the police station, there was 
no question about who controlled this process. A naval captain (and doc­
tor) supervised Barron's torture, as he was beaten, shocked and had his 
testicles squeezed until he fainted. US Ambassador Hugh Gibson visited 
him and protested his torture to Filinto Muller, but there was no saving 
him. Indeed, US Secretary of State Cordell Hull ordered Gibson not to 
involve himself any further in the case. According to Brazilian authori­
ties, Barron committed suicide by jumping from the second floor of the 
central police station. It is unclear ifhe was dead before he went through 
the window, or if he died in the hospital after the fall. 65 In the US, Con­
gressman Vito Marcantonio denounced Barron's torture and murder be­
fore the House of Representatives. He read a statement from Joseph R. 
Brodsky, Barron's lawyer, who claimed personal knowledge ofhis client's 
torture: "They stabbed him with belts and rubber hose; they burned and 
shocked him with live electric wires; they punched and kicked him around 
constantly and did not let him sleep for days.,,66 Neither this publicity nor 
mass protests in the United States did much to end the terror in Brazil, 
because the armed forces perceived that its survival was at stake.67 
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On the day Barron died, 5 March 1936, the police found Prestes and 
Olga Benario in a suburb ofRio de Janeiro. Prestes survived, although he 
endured long imprisonment. Olga (pregnant with Prestes' child) was not 
so fortunate. A German Jew, she was deported to her home country in 
August 1936, where the Gestapo received her. She died in a gas chamber 
in 1942.68 
What is remarkable about this list of horrors is not only its brutality 
but also who was exempt. The military ignored the officers and civilians 
who had initiated this plot. This was not because the government re­
mained ignorant of their role. By the end of 1934 Filinto Muller had 
known everything about the conspirators' plans: the names ofthe partici­
pants, their motivation for rebellion, the names of their messengers and 
the sites where they stored arms.69 But these individuals remained con­
cealed not only immediately after the rebellion but also in the military's 
"official" account of the uprising. The armed forces have collectively 
remembered the rebellion every year, by having senior officers visit a 
cemetery (Sao Joao Batista) where the remains of loyalist soldiers were 
buried. This ceremony served a political purpose: to remind the armed 
forces and the nation of the need for permanent vigilance against the 
Communists.70 
In this context, censorship was an important tool. In a climate in which 
accurate information was impossible to obtain, silence permitted the armed 
forces to rewrite history in their interest. Senior commanders such as 
General Eurico Gaspar Dutra reduced the complex history ofthe uprising 
into a useful myth that illustrated the dangers "foreign" ideologies posed 
to Brazil. Official accounts described how Communist soldiers had mur­
dered sleeping officers in their beds, although this atrocity never occurred?l 
These accounts served to dehumanize the rebels and to justify the terror 
that followed. Censorship also enabled the armed forces to manipulate the 
rebels' identities in other respects. For example, after the rebellion Gen­
eral Pedro Aurelio de Goes Monteiro demanded the creation of a fascist 
state on the nationalist-socialist model to purge Brazil of "Semitic inter­
nationalism.,,72 By linking dissent with ethnic identity, the armed forces 
defined the victims of terror as "others" who were not true Brazilians. It 
became common to refer to the uprising as the "Jewish-Communist con­
spiracy.,,73 In using rhetoric that defined its victims as "aliens," the Brazil­
ian military adopted a discourse (frequently anti-Semitic) often used by 
Latin American militaries to justify repression.74 While in 1910 the rebels 
had been defmed as "other" because of their race, in 1935 the military 
described the rebels as being "foreign" because of their ethnicity. 
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In this context, the military could not have admitted that a fonuer 
president led the initial movement, that conspirators met at his house and 
that his son (Artur Bernardes Filho, a federal congressman) was involved. 
It would have been too disturbing to acknowledge that Arthur Bernardes 
stored munitions and other supplies at his property in Vi~osa. The list of 
officers involved included many highly respected men. Important civilians 
participated in the initial plotting, such as Joao Neves da Fontoura and 
Christiano Machado.75 These revelations would not only have made mili­
tary terror unacceptable, but also have prevented the armed forces from 
using the uprising as a political tool. Instead, the rebellion served to rally 
frightened Brazilian elites behind the state and the military. It also justified 
a radical purge of the politicalleft.76 For this reason, the military con­
cealed the roots ofthe uprising among its commanders and instead argued 
that the rebellion had come from outside the institution, from a still-dan­
gerous enemy. n 
As key commanders, such as General Goes Monteiro and General 
Dutra, sought to reshape the military's relationship with the Brazilian 
state, they used the threat of Communism as a political tool. The Brazil­
ian government had worked since the 1920s to define Communism as the 
nation's enemy. It proved more attractive for elites to explain dissent in 
tenus of a foreign ideology than by referring to the internal causes of 
discontent. As the army sought to expand its political power, it turned to 
this legacy. In 1937 the Brazilian army "found" a Communist plan to 
take over the nation. In reality, a member of Goes Monteiro's staff (Cap­
tain Olimpio Mourao Filho, a member of the Brazilian fascist party the 
lntegralistas) probably wrote this document based on an article in a French 
military magazine.78 This forgery helped to rally civilian and military 
support for a coup that made Vargas a dictator and the military the basis 
for the regime. State censorship, torture and silencing continued throughout 
the Estado Novo.79 
There could be no challenge to the military's official history, because 
this would have challenged the government's legitimacy. Not only civilians 
but also many officers had to be convinced of one version of the past. 
Accordingly, the armed forces shaped the state institution responsible for 
censorship during the Estado Novo. When the head of the Departamento 
de Imprensa e Propaganda (Department ofPress and Propaganda, or DIP) 
resigned, Vargas replaced him with an army major who had served as the 
head of the army's secret service.8o The military did not directly take part 
in political torture; it left this work to the police. But the armed forces 
also shaped state violence to conceal their use of terror. 
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During the Estado Novo repression generally took place either under 
the aegis ofthe Division of Social and Political Police (DOPS), which was 
led by an army captain named Afonso Miranda Correia or by civilian police 
under the authority of Filinto Muller (who, as the chief of police in the 
federal district at this time, controlled civilian police throughout Brazil}. 81 
When Muller resigned his position in July 1942, Vargas replaced him with 
army colonel Alcides Etchegoyen. Muller promptly returned to the anny 
to serve as a cabinet official on Minister of War Dutra's staff.82 When 
Etchegoyen resigned as police chief in August 1943, Vargas replaced him 
with another army officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Nelson de Mello. These 
appointments reflected the extent to which the military had acquired influ­
ence within the state apparatus dedicated to intelligence, propaganda and 
repression. Although Brazil was ruled by a civilian dictator, Vargas relied 
on the anned forces as the basis of his regime. In this context, the lines 
between civilian agencies and the armed forces became blurred. 
This situation pennitted the military to enforce silence. The state cen­
sored all discussion of the 1910 rebellion. When Gustavo Barroso wrote 
about the naval rebellion for the newspaper A Manhii during the Estado 
Novo he was called to the DIP, the agency responsible for censorship. Major 
Amilcar Dutra de Menezes told him that he was not to write any further on 
this topic, on the orders of the Minister of the Navy, Admiral Aristides 
Guilhem.83 The military also sought to conceal the true history ofthe 1935 
uprising. This suppression of the past created a strange disjunction be­
tween public perception and military policy. For example, during a later 
military government the anned forces appointed Filinto Muller to be head 
of the Conselho de Defesa dos Direitos da Pessoa Humana (Human Rights 
Defence Council) ofthe Ministry ofJustice.84 This action symbolized not 
only military hypocrisy but also the extent to which the anned forces be­
lieved they could manipulate the memory of the past. The military could 
not be satisfied only with eliminating dissent through the use of terror; it 
also had to use censorship and silencing to maintain its legitimacy and to 
shape Brazil's political culture in its interests. 
Conclusion 
Brazilian officers did not suddenly create political terror as a tool during 
the periods described. They did not have to. Instead, during moments of 
crisis officers adopted older traditions of violence present in their cul­
ture. Brazilian society had long been governed by a series of contradic­
· tions. The idealized patriarchy advanced in Freyre's Casa Grande bore 
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little resemblance to the true experience of Brazilian inequality. Vargas 
represented himself as the "Father ofthe Poor," but he was also the author 
of political terror during the Estado Novo.85 The contrast between ideol­
ogy and reality had always made key legitimating myths (such as that ofa 
benevolent patriarchy) vulnerable. Brazilian elites (landowners, slave-hold­
ers and regional strongmen) had long used violence to enforce beliefs that 
supported their power. The military also possessed a tradition ofterror and 
violence that stretched back into Brazil's colonial history. In meeting new 
challenges to its interests, it drew on this legacy. 
It is for the same reason that the military used terror to end all dis­
cussion of its violence. Any examination of terror would have under­
mined the ideological beliefs that the elites used to justify their rule. This 
effort met with surprising success. Yet, terror represented only one tool 
at the military's disposal in its efforts to shape historical memory. Al­
though the armed forces frequently clashed with the elites dominating 
Brazilian politics, the two groups shared an identity of interests that en­
couraged elites not to challenge certain historical beliefs. For this reason, 
Freyre did not discuss race as a cause of the 1910 revolt, although he 
quoted the racist comments of a Brazilian naval officer. Because of this, 
even the best scholarship on the 1935 rebellion (by William Waack and 
Paulo Sergio Pinheiro) failed to uncover the roots of the rebellion within 
the military itself. In writing his study Paulo Sergio Pinheiro had access 
to 90,000 documents offormer President Artur da Silva Bemardes, then 
in the possession of his son.86 Both father and son had taken part in the 
conspiracy. Yet the origins of the rebellion among Bernardista (follow­
ers of Artur Bemardes) officers remained obscure, because the former 
President's family and the military both shared an interest in concealing 
the truth. 
In the final analysis, then, the military's hegemony has endured be­
cause of the complicity of different political actors operating under a 
largely authoritarian structure. As the current process ofdemocratization 
proceeds, however, scholars may now be better positioned to reconsider 
old myths and thus to come to a clearer understanding of the military's 
role in Brazilian society and politics. 
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